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Abstract
The CNI model of moral decision-making is a formal model that quantifies (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity
to moral norms, and (3) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Based on a critique
of the CNI model’s conceptual assumptions, properties of the moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model, and the
robustness of findings obtained with the CNI model against changes in model specifications, Baron and Goodwin (2020)
dismissed the CNI model as a valid approach to study moral dilemma judgments. Here, we respond to their critique, showing
that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key aspects of the model;
(2) a conceptually problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3) arguments that are
inconsistent with empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings resulting from changes in
model specifications, although the reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI
model yield consistent findings across model specifications. Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for greater
precision in the description of the three model parameters and for greater attention to properties of individual dilemmas, the
available evidence indicates that the CNI model is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper insights
into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach that pits moral
norms against consequences for the greater good (e.g., trolley dilemma).
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1 Introduction
A central question in moral psychology is how people make
decisions in moral dilemmas that involve a conflict between
moral norms and the greater good. Research on this question
has predominantly relied on hypothetical scenarios such as
the trolley problem, in which a runaway trolley is approach-
ing a group of five individuals who would be killed if the
trolley continues on its path. In one variant known as the
switch dilemma, participants are asked if it would be accept-
able to pull a switch to redirect the trolley to another track
where it would kill only one person instead of five (Foot,
1967). In another variant known as the footbridge dilemma,
This research was supported by National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant
BCS-1449620 to Bertram Gawronski and a Heisenberg grant (HU 1978/7-
1) from the German Research Foundation to Mandy Hütter. Any opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this article are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding
agencies.
Copyright: © 2020. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗University of Texas at Austin. Email: gawronski@utexas.edu.
†Florida State University .
‡Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen.
§University of Texas at Austin.
¶University of Western Ontario.
‖Wilfrid Laurier University.
participants are asked if it would be acceptable to push a
person from a bridge to stop the trolley (Thomson, 1971).
Adopting terminology from moral philosophy, participants
are said to have made a characteristically utilitarian judg-
ment if they judge the described actions as acceptable. Con-
versely, participants are said to have made a characteristically
deontological judgment if they judge the described actions
as unacceptable (Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek &
Greene, 2018). From a utilitarian view, the described actions
would be acceptable because they maximize the well-being
of a larger number of people. In contrast, from a deonto-
logical view, the described actions would be unacceptable
because they are in conflict with the moral norm that one
should not kill other people. Over the past two decades,
a substantial amount of research has investigated contextual
conditions that make people more or less likely to prefer util-
itarian over deontological judgments, individual differences
in the preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments,
and the mental processes underlying utilitarian and deonto-
logical judgments (Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro &
McGraw, 2015).
Research using the trolley problem (and similar sacrifi-
cial dilemmas) has been criticized for relying on unrealis-
tic, sometimes humorous scenarios that have little resem-
blance with the kinds of moral dilemmas people are facing
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in real-world contexts (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels & War-
ren, 2014; Körner, Joffe & Deutsch, 2019). In addition to
addressing this concern by using realistic dilemmas inspired
by real-world cases, our own research aimed to resolve a
more fundamental limitation of the traditional dilemma ap-
proach: the confounding of multiple factors in the mea-
surement of moral judgments. To resolve these confounds,
we have developed a mathematical model called the CNI
model of moral decision-making, which quantifies three de-
terminants of moral dilemma judgments: (1) sensitivity to
consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral norms, and (3) gen-
eral preference for inaction versus action (Gawronski, Arm-
strong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter, 2017). Based on a cri-
tique of this work, Baron and Goodwin (2020) dismissed the
CNI model as a valid approach to studying moral dilemma
judgments. Here, we respond to their criticism, clarifying
which of their concerns are justified and which ones are not.
Although Baron and Goodwin’s critique reveals a need for
greater precision in the description of the three model pa-
rameters and for greater attention to properties of individual
dilemmas, we argue that Baron and Goodwin’s dismissal of
the CNI model is based on: (1) misunderstandings of key as-
pects of the model; (2) a conceptually problematic conflation
of behavioral effects and explanatory mental constructs; (3)
arguments that are inconsistent with empirical evidence; and
(4) reanalyses that supposedly show inconsistent findings re-
sulting from changes in model specifications, although the
reported reanalyses did not actually use the CNI model and
proper analyses with the CNI model yield consistent findings
across model specifications. We conclude that, counter to
Baron and Goodwin’s conclusion, the CNI model is a valid,
robust, and empirically sound approach to gaining deeper
insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments,
overcoming major limitations of the traditional approach.
2 The CNI Model
Because Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) critique is partly based
on misunderstandings of key aspects of the CNI model, we
deem it important to provide some background information
about the model for our rebuttal of their critique. The CNI
model is based on the notion that utilitarian judgments are
characterized by the feature of being influenced by the con-
sequences of a given action for the greater good, whereas
deontological judgments are characterized by the feature of
being influenced by the consistency of a given action with
moral norms (Gawronski & Beer, 2017). Thus, to classify
moral judgments as utilitarian, one would need to demon-
strate that they vary as a function of relevant consequences
for the greater good. Conversely, to classify moral judg-
ments as deontological, one would need to demonstrate that
they vary as a function of relevant moral norms. Whereas
the former requires experimental manipulations of conse-
quences, the latter requires experimental manipulations of
moral norms. Both are largely absent in research using
the traditional dilemma approach, which focuses almost ex-
clusively on (1) cases where the benefits of a focal action
for the greater good outweigh its costs (without considering
cases where the benefits of the focal action are smaller than
its costs) and (2) actions that are prohibited by proscriptive
norms (without considering actions that are prescribed by
prescriptive norms).
These limitations pose a significant challenge to the in-
terpretation of moral dilemma judgments. For example, if
a participant finds it acceptable to redirect the trolley in the
switch dilemma regardless of whether it would save five
lives or only one, questions could be raised about whether it
is justified to categorize the participant’s responses as utili-
tarian, because they are unaffected by the consequences for
the greater good. Similarly, if a participant is unwilling to
perform a focal action regardless of whether this action is
prohibited by a proscriptive norm (e.g., killing a person) or
prescribed by a prescriptive norm (e.g., saving a person’s
life), questions could be raised about the deontological na-
ture of these judgments, because they may reflect general
action aversion rather than effects of moral norms.
A different way of describing these issues is that the tradi-
tional approach includes two confounds in the measurement
of moral dilemma judgments (Gawronski, Conway, Arm-
strong, Friesdorf & Hütter, 2016). First, because accept-
ing one option implies rejecting the other, it is impossible
to determine whether differences in moral dilemma judg-
ments are driven by differences in the tendency to make a
“utilitarian” judgment, differences in the tendency to make a
“deontological” judgment, or differences in both (Conway &
Gawronski, 2013). Second, because research using the tradi-
tional dilemma approach has focused almost exclusively on
cases involving proscriptive norms, “utilitarian” judgments
are confounded with general preference for action and “deon-
tological” judgments are confounded with general preference
for inaction (Crone & Laham, 2017).
To resolve these interpretational ambiguities, we proposed
an alternative approach in which responses are compared
across four types of dilemmas that vary in terms of whether
(1) the consequences of the focal action for the greater good
are either greater or smaller than the costs and (2) the focal
action is either proscribed by a proscriptive norm or pre-
scribed by a prescriptive norm. Expanding on this approach,
we developed a multinomial model that quantifies the ex-
tent to which participants’ responses across the four types
of dilemmas reflect a response pattern that is sensitive to
consequences (see first row in Figure 1), a response pattern
that is sensitive to moral norms (see second row in Figure 1),
and a general preference for inaction versus action (see third
and fourth row in Figure 1). Sensitivity to consequences
is captured by the model’s C parameter, with higher scores
reflecting a greater impact of consequences on moral judg-
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Figure 1: CNI model of moral decision-making predicting action versus inaction responses in moral dilemmas with proscriptive
and prescriptive norms and consequences involving benefits of action that are either greater or smaller than the costs of action.
Reproduced from Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, and Hütter (2017). Reprinted with permission from the American
Psychological Association.
ments. Sensitivity to moral norms is captured by model’s
N parameter, with higher scores reflecting a greater impact
of moral norms on moral judgments. General preference for
inaction versus action is captured by the model’s I param-
eter, with higher scores reflecting a general preference for
inaction and lower scores reflecting a general preference for
action.
Based on the processing tree depicted in Figure 1, the CNI
model provides four mathematical equations that include the
three model parameters as unknowns and the observed prob-
abilities of action (vs. inaction) responses on the four kinds
of dilemmas as known numerical values (see Appendix A).1
Numerical values for the three parameters are estimated via
maximum likelihood statistics, aiming to minimize the dif-
ference between the empirically observed probabilities of
action (vs. inaction) responses on the four types of dilemmas
and the probabilities of action (vs. inaction) responses pre-
dicted by the model equations using the identified parameter
estimates. The estimated scores for each parameter reflect
a probability that can vary between 0 and 1. For the C pa-
rameter, scores significantly greater than zero indicate that
responses were affected by the manipulation of consequences
in a manner such that participants showed a response pattern
that maximizes the greater good. For the N parameter, scores
significantly greater than zero indicate that responses were
affected by the manipulation of moral norms such that partic-
ipants showed a response pattern that is congruent with both
proscriptive and prescriptive norms. Finally, for the I param-
eter, scores significantly greater than 0.5 indicate a general
1Note that there are only four non-redundant equations among the eight
equations in the Appendix, because p(action) = 1 − p(inaction).
preference for inaction and scores significantly lower than
0.5 indicate a general preference for action. The adequacy
of the model in describing the data can be evaluated by means
of goodness-of-fit statistics, such that poor model fit would
be reflected in a statistically significant deviation between
the empirically observed probabilities and the probabilities
predicted by the model (for more details, see Gawronski et
al., 2017).
3 Deontological Responding
A central point of Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) critique is
that bias against action, as captured by the I parameter, is an
explanation of deontological responding rather than an alter-
native process. Although we would argue that bias against
action is not a mental process but a pattern of responding, we
fully agree that a general preference for inaction can be inter-
preted as a particular instance of deontological responding.
In fact, we already acknowledged such an interpretation in the
original publication on the CNI model when we discussed the
(in)consistency of our findings with Greene’s (2008) dual-
process theory of moral dilemma judgments (Gawronski et
al., 2017, p. 365):
“A potential way to reconcile [our findings] with the dual-
process model is to interpret general preference for inaction
as an instance of deontological responding. In line with this
idea, the doctrine of doing and allowing (DDA) states that
actively causing harm is morally worse than merely allowing
harm, which is consistent with the finding that harm caused
by action is perceived as worse than equivalent harm caused
by inaction [. . . ]. Conceptually, the DDA can be regarded as
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a deontological principle in the sense that the moral status of
a behavioral option depends on its consistency with a general
rule.”
Baron and Goodwin’s explication of this idea is much
more detailed compared to our analysis, and we agree with
almost every aspect of their arguments about a deontological
interpretation of generalized inaction. That being said, we
would like to note that a conceptualization of generalized
inaction as an instance of deontological responding remains
incomplete if it does not acknowledge adherence to both
proscriptive and prescriptive norms as a distinct pattern of
deontological responding over and above generalized inac-
tion. Although both response patterns can be interpreted
as instances of deontological responding in a philosophical
sense, they are conceptually distinct in the sense that they
involve different behavioral signatures. As we stated in the
original publication on the CNI model (Gawronski et al.,
2017, p. 365):
“Although the two ways of responding may be deemed
deontological in a philosophical sense, they should not be
conflated in a psychological theory about the mechanisms
underlying moral dilemma judgment. After all, sensitivity
to moral norms and general preference for inaction are func-
tionally distinct in terms of their psychological antecedents
and their behavioral outcomes. Their distinct outcomes are
reflected in the fact that the two ways of responding lead to
different judgments in moral dilemmas involving a prescrip-
tive norm. Their distinct antecedents are reflected in the cur-
rent finding that a given factor can simultaneously strengthen
one way of ‘deontological’ responding while weakening the
other way of ‘deontological’ responding.”
Thus, although we agree with Baron and Goodwin’s
(2020) argument that bias against action can be interpreted
as an instance of deontological responding, their dominant
focus on generalized inaction ignores that adherence to pro-
scriptive and prescriptive norms represents a distinct pattern
of deontological responding that does not involve general-
ized inaction. That being said, there is a nuance to Baron and
Goodwin’s argument that suggests potentially misleading as-
pects in the descriptions we have chosen for the response
patterns captured by the N and the I parameter.
By describing the response pattern captured by the N pa-
rameter as sensitivity to moral norms and the response pat-
tern captured by the I parameter as general preference for
inaction versus action, our descriptions suggest that only the
former, but not the latter, response pattern would be con-
gruent with moral norms. However, as correctly noted by
Baron and Goodwin (2020), a pattern of generalized inaction
is congruent with the broad deontological norm first, do no
harm, suggesting that congruence with moral norms is not
a distinguishing feature of the two parameters. Baron and
Goodwin (2020) are also correct in their observation that
the response pattern captured by the I parameter may reflect
either a domain-specific aversion against causing harm or
a domain-independent response bias (see Hennig & Hütter,
2020). Based on these considerations, we acknowledge that
some aspects of our parameter descriptions are not ideal and
potentially misleading, which includes some of the descrip-
tions in the processing tree depicted in Figure 1 (e.g., the
description of 1 − N as moral norms do not drive response).
For the sake of consistency with prior CNI model terminol-
ogy, we will continue to describe the response pattern cap-
tured by the N parameter as sensitivity to moral norms, yet
with the qualification that this description is meant to refer
specifically to the effect of proscriptive versus prescriptive
norms on moral judgments (rather than a pattern of general-
ized inaction that is congruent with the broad norm first, do
no harm). Moreover, the description general preference for
inaction versus action should be interpreted in a purely be-
havioral manner that is agnostic about whether generalized
inaction on the I parameter reflects a domain-specific aver-
sion against causing harm or a domain-independent response
bias. These qualifications are important for the interpretation
of the two parameters, because they imply that the I param-
eter may capture a norm-congruent response pattern that is
distinct from the norm-congruent response pattern captured
by the N parameter. Yet, regardless of these qualifications,
we would still argue that both response patterns are essential
for understanding responses to moral dilemmas and their un-
derlying mental processes. We will return to this issue in the
section entitled “Confounds in the Traditional Approach.”
4 Moral Norms
A bias against action is relatively easy to identify, because
it involves a general preference for inaction regardless of the
specific situation (see third row in Figure 1). In contrast, dif-
ferential responses to dilemmas with proscriptive and pre-
scriptive norms are more difficult to identify, because any
such endeavor requires construct-valid operationalizations
of the two kinds of moral norms (see second row in Figure
1). A second major point of Baron and Goodwin’s (2020)
critique is that our battery of moral dilemmas for research
using the CNI model does not meet this criterion.
To address this concern, we deem it helpful to first clarify
how we identified the focal actions and their corresponding
moral norms in the construction of CNI model dilemmas. In
a first step, we identified pairs of morally relevant actions and
inactions that have the same outcome (e.g., killing Person A
and letting Person A die both result in the loss of Person
A’s life). Whereas the identified action within each action-
inaction pair was conceptually linked to a proscriptive norm
(i.e., killing someone is morally prohibited), the opposite of
the identified inaction was conceptually linked to a prescrip-
tive norm (i.e., saving someone’s live is morally prescribed).
In a second step, we generated hypothetical consequences of
the two actions that involve costs for the well-being of others
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that are either greater or smaller than the benefits of each
action. In a third step, we created plausible scenarios of high
real-world relevance, which were designed to be as similar
as possible in the four variants of each basic dilemma. Thus,
based on the rationale underlying the development of CNI
model dilemmas, the relevant moral norms and their corre-
sponding actions are identified in the first step independent
of their consequences and independent of secondary aspects
of the particular scenarios. In all cases, the relevant pro-
scriptive norms pertain to directly causing harm regardless
of the situation (e.g., killing someone), whereas the rele-
vant prescriptive norms pertain to directly preventing harm
regardless of the situation (e.g., saving someone’s life).
Baron and Goodwin (2020) correctly point out that pre-
scriptive norms tend to be weaker than proscriptive norms
(e.g., killing someone is perceived as morally worse than let-
ting someone die). Baron and Goodwin conclude from this
asymmetry that our modeling approach is destined to fail,
because it requires a switch of actions and inactions while
maintaining equivalent norms, which seems virtually impos-
sible. Although we agree that the asymmetry between pro-
scriptive and prescriptive norms is fundamentally important,
it is irrelevant for the construction of CNI model dilemmas
to the extent that the proximal outcomes of a given action-
inaction pair can be held constant (e.g., loss of the same life
as a result of killing or letting die). From the perspective of
the CNI model, the possibility of symmetric and asymmet-
ric effects of the two kinds of norms is not a methodological
obstacle, but an empirical phenomenon that is captured by
the difference between the N and the I parameter. Whereas
the response pattern defining the N parameter is congruent
with both proscriptive and prescriptive norms, the response
pattern defining the I parameter is congruent with only one
of the two norms but not the other (with the specific con-
gruency depending on whether scores are greater or smaller
than 0.5; see Figure 1).
A related concern raised by Baron and Goodwin (2020)
is that a considerable number of participants seem to dis-
agree with our assumptions about relevant moral norms in
the CNI model dilemmas. To support their argument, Baron
and Goodwin present the results of two studies in which par-
ticipants were asked to identify for a selected subset of CNI
model dilemmas (and a set of newly created dilemmas) if
there is a rule that favors a particular response and, if so,
which response is favored by that rule. Their main finding is
that many participants identified patterns of rules that conflict
with the conceptual assumptions underlying the operational-
ization of moral norms in our CNI model dilemmas, which
led them to question the validity of our operationalization.
A major problem with Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) ar-
gument and the presented data is that they conflate different
levels of analysis. As we explained in Gawronski, Conway,
Armstrong, Friesdorf and Hütter (2018), the CNI model
is a descriptive model that quantifies patterns of stimulus-
response relations at the behavioral level of analysis (see De
Houwer, 2011; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015). Applied
to the operationalization of moral norms in our dilemmas, the
“stimulus” involves descriptions of actions that cause harm
(capturing the presence of a proscriptive norm) or descrip-
tions of actions that prevent harm (capturing the presence of
a prescriptive norm). The “response” involves participants’
judgments of the described actions (e.g., acceptable or un-
acceptable). The N parameter merely captures the extent
to which participants’ responses differ across the two cases,
which reflects their sensitivity to the two kinds of norms in
responding to the moral dilemmas (see Figure 1). The CNI
model does not make any assumptions about the mental pro-
cesses underlying the observed response pattern. The latter
question pertains to the mental level of analysis, which aims
to identify the mental processes underlying observed pat-
terns of stimulus-response relations at the behavioral level
(see De Houwer, 2011; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015).
Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) critique is based on the tacit
background assumption that an experimental manipulation
of moral norms is construct-valid only if the behavioral ef-
fect of this manipulation is driven by conscious thoughts
about moral norms. Their data suggest that this is not
the case for our manipulation of moral norms, because it
does not map onto the moral norms identified by the partic-
ipants in their studies. However, by requiring that conscious
thoughts about moral norms must underlie norm-congruent
judgments, Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) critique not only
conflates behavioral effects with explanatory mental con-
structs (see De Houwer, 2011; Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2015); it also ignores one of the most significant contri-
butions to moral psychology in the 21st century: the idea
that norm-congruent judgments may not necessarily be the
product of conscious thoughts about norms (Greene, 2008;
Haidt, 2001). For example, according to Greene’s (2008)
dual-process theory of moral dilemma judgments, norm-
congruent judgments are driven by affective processes that
do not involve conscious thoughts about moral norms. As
we noted above, the CNI model is a descriptive model of
stimulus-response relations at the behavioral level and the
model does not make any assumptions about underlying
processes at the mental level (see Gawronski et al., 2018).
Hence, the pattern of norm-congruent responses captured
by the N parameters could be driven by conscious thoughts
about moral norms, affective responses to the idea of causing
harm, or something entirely different. From this perspective,
involvement of conscious thoughts about moral norms is not
a suitable criterion to evaluate the validity of our experi-
mental manipulation of moral norms, because people may
behave in line with moral norms without consciously identi-
fying their responses as reflecting moral norms.
If mental processes are inadequate to determine the va-
lidity of our norm manipulation, what is a good alterna-
tive to evaluate its validity? A relatively simple criterion is
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Table 1: Goodness-of-fit statistics for the CNI model in all studies published by the current authors that have used the original
battery of 24 moral dilemmas for research using the CNI model.
Reference Study # N G2 df p
Bialek, Paruzel-Czachura & Gawronski (2019) 1 634 14.29 8 .074
Brannon, Carr, Jin, Josephs & Gawronski (2019) 1 200 0.79 2 .675
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 1a 201 1.32 2 .517
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 1b 197 1.51 2 .469
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 2a 194 4.98 2 .083
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 2b 194 1.29 2 .524
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 3a 186 11.93 2 .003
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 3b 189 4.19 2 .123
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 4a 184 0.29 2 .864
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) 4b 198 0.18 2 .916
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) S1a 195 0.68 2 .713
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter (2017) S1b 191 0.84 2 .656
Gawronski & Brannon (2020) 1a 140 2.72 2 .257
Gawronski & Brannon (2020) 1b 120 0.11 2 .945
Gawronski & Brannon (2020) 2a 91 2.52 2 .284
Gawronski & Brannon (2020) 2b 120 0.41 2 .817
Gawronski & Brannon (2020) 3 255 12.15 4 .016
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 1a 128 2.08 2 .354
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 1b 120 0.74 2 .691
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 2a 119 0.06 2 .972
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 2b 120 0.34 2 .842
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 3a 120 2.08 2 .353
Gawronski, Conway, Armstrong, Friesdorf & Hütter (2018) 3b 120 2.14 2 .343
that, although participants may not consciously think about
moral norms in a manner that corresponds to our experi-
mental manipulation, they should respond to the dilemmas
in a manner “as if” they agree with the assumptions un-
derlying our operationalization of moral norms (see above).
In other words, participants should show evidence for rule-
conforming judgments, even if they do not show any evidence
for rule-following judgments. Multinomial modeling offers
two pieces of evidence that are relevant for this question.
First, if participants did not respond in a manner “as if”
they agreed with the assumptions underlying our operational-
ization of moral norms, the CNI model should be unable to
provide accurate descriptions of the data, and thus show
poor model fit across studies (Klauer, 2015). Counter to
this possibility, the CNI model fit the data well in almost
every published study that we conducted with our original
dilemma battery (see Table 1). Out of 23 published studies,
there are only two studies in which the response probabilities
predicted by the CNI model significantly deviated from the
response probabilities observed in the data. With an alpha-
criterion of .05, this proportion is close to the probability
of obtaining a significant difference in the absence of an ac-
tually existing difference. If we include every unpublished
study from our group using the original CNI model battery,
the proportion is even lower with only two out of 32 studies
in which the model did not fit the data.
Second, if participants did not respond in a manner “as
if” they agreed with the assumptions underlying our oper-
ationalization of moral norms, the N parameter should not
significantly differ from zero (Klauer, 2015). Counter to this
possibility, the N parameter was significantly greater than
zero in every single study we have conducted with the CNI
model. The only exception is a subsample of participants
who were preselected based on having psychopathy scores
that placed them in the highest quartile of participants in
a broader sample (Gawronski et al., 2017, Study 4b). We
will return to this finding in the section entitled “’Perverse’
Responses.” Together, the two pieces of evidence support
the assumption that participants respond in a manner “as if”
they agree with the assumptions underlying our operational-
ization of moral norms.
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5 Item Characteristics
The reported data on model fit and the significant difference
of the N parameter from zero suggest that, on average, partic-
ipants respond to the CNI model dilemmas in a manner that is
consistent with the assumptions underlying our operational-
ization of moral norms. However, these results are based
on aggregate responses to all dilemmas. Although aggre-
gation of responses across multiple items has the advantage
of reducing the likelihood of false negatives by controlling
for measurement error, it can lead to false positives if an
observed effect is driven by a subset of items with idiosyn-
cratic features that are unrelated to the construct of interest
(Judd, Westfall & Kenny, 2012). As noted by Baron and
Goodwin (2020), multinomial modeling does not consider
potential differences between individual dilemmas and their
contribution to the obtained results. Although the problems
associated with item-specific effects have received increased
attention during the last years, there is no straightforward
way to statistically control for item-specific effects within
multinomial modeling. This limitation raises the question of
whether the items of our dilemma battery are equally valid
in capturing the manipulations of consequences and moral
norms.
Baron and Goodwin (2020) aimed to address this ques-
tion by analyzing item-specific proportions of “perverse”
responses, which they define as responses that go against
both moral norms and the greater good when the two sug-
gest the same decision. However, from the perspective of
the CNI model, this strategy remains uninformative about
the validity of a given dilemma, because incidental features
of a given scenario may shift responses toward action or
inaction for all four variants without qualifying the effects
of consequences and moral norms (see Schwarz, 1999). In
other words, a given item may show “perverse” responses in
terms of Baron and Goodwin’s criterion, but the four variants
of a given dilemma may still reliably capture the manipula-
tions of consequences and moral norms. Thus, to determine
whether the items of our dilemma battery are equally valid
in capturing the manipulations of consequences and moral
norms, it is essential to analyze whether the two manipu-
lations are effective in influencing responses on each basic
dilemma. For the manipulation of consequences, this ques-
tion boils down to the proportion of action (vs. inaction) re-
sponses on dilemmas where the benefits of action are greater
than the costs compared to the proportion of action (vs. in-
action) responses on dilemmas where the benefits of action
are smaller than the costs. For the manipulation of moral
norms, the question boils down to the proportion of action
(vs. inaction) responses on dilemmas where a proscriptive
norm prohibits action compared to the proportion of action
(vs. inaction) responses on dilemmas where a prescriptive
norm prescribes action. The two comparisons should reveal
meaningful differences in the expected direction for each
basic dilemma across the four variants.
Using these criteria, our pilot tests supported the validity
of each basic dilemma that was included in the final battery
of dilemmas for research using the CNI model (some other
dilemmas were discarded because they did not meet these
criteria). In response to Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) cri-
tique, we reassessed the properties of the dilemmas in the
final battery using the data of the eight studies reported by
Gawronski et al. (2017). Our reanalysis revealed that the
manipulation of consequences was well captured by every
single item across studies (see Table 2). However, the ma-
nipulation of moral norms revealed anomalies for one of the
six basic dilemmas (see Table 2). Specifically, we found
that the Abduction Dilemma showed patterns of action vs.
inaction responses that were unaffected by the manipulation
of moral norms in six of the eight studies. Moreover, in the
two studies that revealed a significant effect of moral norms,
the pattern of responses was opposite to the intended manip-
ulation. Based on these findings, we deem the Abduction
Dilemma as not suitable for our modeling approach. The
results obtained for our other five basic dilemmas generally
supported their validity.
Given that the CNI model showed adequate fit across stud-
ies (see Table 1) and the N parameter was significantly dif-
ferent from zero in every single case except for a subsample
of participants high in psychopathy (see above), we deem it
unlikely that the poor validity of the Abduction Dilemma af-
fected any of our findings. Nevertheless, to gain greater con-
fidence in the reliability of our findings, we reanalyzed the
data of all eight studies reported in Gawronski et al. (2017)
after excluding responses to the four variants of the Abduc-
tion Dilemma.2 The original results reported by Gawronski
et al. (2017) are summarized in Table 3, along with the re-
sults of our reanalysis. Overall, the results of the reanalysis
were highly consistent with our original findings. Of the
24 comparisons, 23 revealed equivalent results in terms of
whether the comparison reached statistical significance with
an alpha criterion of p < .05. The only difference was ob-
tained for a significant effect in the original analysis that
turned marginal in the reanalysis. This comparison involves
a greater sensitivity to consequences among women com-
pared to men in Study 1b, an effect that we did not interpret
in the original article, because it did not emerge in Study
1a. Together, these results suggest that the inclusion of the
Abduction Dilemma did not affect the findings reported in
Gawronski et al. (2017). Nevertheless, based on the results of
our item analysis, we recommend that researchers using the
CNI model exclude the Abduction Dilemma from the pool
of items. To compensate for the smaller number of items
(and the resulting loss of statistical power), researchers may
2The analysis files for the reported reanalyses are available at
https://osf.io/u59zs/.
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Table 2: Proportion of “action” responses as a function of consequences (benefits of action greater vs. smaller than costs),
moral norms (proscriptive vs. prescriptive), and dilemma in the studies by Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, and
Hütter (2017).












F p F p
Dilemma 1: Abduction
Study 1a 66.7% 43.8% 60.2% 27.9% 73.99 <.001 5.77 .017
Study 1b 59.4% 39.6% 68.5% 36.5% 63.43 <.001 0.45 .504
Study 2a 65.5% 44.8% 66.0% 24.2% 82.98 <.001 5.50 .020
Study 2b 65.5% 42.8% 64.4% 27.3% 74.94 <.001 3.32 .070
Study 3a 67.7% 31.2% 69.9% 31.2% 126.08 <.001 0.05 .818
Study 3b 64.6% 36.0% 67.7% 29.1% 91.33 <.001 0.16 .686
Study 4a 62.0% 39.7% 66.8% 23.9% 90.79 <.001 1.21 .274
Study 4b 60.6% 39.9% 62.1% 24.2% 71.20 <.001 2.47 .118
Dilemma 2: Transplant
Study 1a 26.4% 19.9% 77.6% 67.2% 13.65 <.001 115.09 <.001
Study 1b 18.3% 12.7% 82.2% 74.4% 8.50 .004 304.55 <.001
Study 2a 18.6% 14.4% 81.4% 70.6% 12.94 <.001 219.41 <.001
Study 2b 18.0% 16.5% 74.2% 70.1% 1.99 .160 161.69 <.001
Study 3a 24.2% 18.3% 75.8% 71.5% 7.99 .005 109.13 <.001
Study 3b 19.7% 18.1% 81.9% 77.7% 3.72 .055 175.01 <.001
Study 4a 24.5% 20.7% 73.4% 72.8% 1.28 .259 97.20 <.001
Study 4b 26.3% 27.3% 67.7% 62.6% 0.80 .372 55.35 <.001
Dilemma 3: Torture
Study 1a 65.7% 16.4% 68.2% 44.3% 128.37 <.001 13.01 <.001
Study 1b 67.0% 14.7% 76.6% 51.8% 127.19 <.001 34.09 <.001
Study 2a 71.1% 17.5% 61.3% 49.5% 96.74 <.001 7.09 .008
Study 2b 68.6% 17.5% 68.0% 48.5% 96.12 <.001 15.12 <.001
Study 3a 62.4% 8.1% 74.7% 48.4% 137.27 <.001 38.46 <.001
Study 3b 73.5% 13.8% 67.2% 40.7% 202.64 <.001 5.20 .024
Study 4a 72.8% 21.7% 59.8% 23.9% 133.39 <.001 1.63 .203
Study 4b 67.2% 22.2% 58.1% 35.4% 104.28 <.001 0.20 .653
Continued.
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F p F p
Dilemma 4: Assisted Suicide
Study 1a 64.7% 33.8% 73.6& 49.3% 91.69 <.001 8.56 .004
Study 1b 62.9% 31.5% 75.6% 50.3% 78.83 <.001 16.31 <.001
Study 2a 64.4% 34.0% 72.7% 53.6% 63.45 <.001 11.29 .001
Study 2b 61.3% 27.3% 75.8% 51.0% 93.01 <.001 22.91 <.001
Study 3a 59.1% 25.3% 68.8% 44.6% 73.76 <.001 12.07 .001
Study 3b 60.8% 21.2% 67.7% 41.3% 114.01 <.001 12.61 <.001
Study 4a 54.3% 23.4% 66.3% 47.3% 58.49 <.001 16.27 <.001
Study 4b 59.1% 26.8% 70.2% 42.9% 81.65 <.001 10.77 .001
Dilemma 5: Immune Deficiency
Study 1a 28.9% 24.4% 52.2% 40.3% 13.28 <.001 18.27 <.001
Study 1b 29.9% 27.9% 54.8% 43.1% 8.50 .004 21.17 <.001
Study 2a 28.4% 24.7% 54.1% 46.4% 6.73 .010 29.00 <.001
Study 2b 30.4% 30.4% 59.3% 45.9% 6.97 .009 29.93 <.001
Study 3a 19.5% 18.9% 61.1% 53.0% 4.20 .042 69.61 <.001
Study 3b 30.7% 32.3% 56.1% 47.1% 2.47 .118 20.13 <.001
Study 4a 28.3% 27.2% 53.8% 43.5% 4.95 .027 22.10 <.001
Study 4b 27.3% 26.3% 57.1% 45.5% 6.77 .010 36.08 <.001
Dilemma 6: Vaccine
Study 1a 53.7% 36.8% 75.1% 65.7% 28.23 <.001 26.55 <.001
Study 1b 50.3% 35.5% 80.7% 72.1% 16.54 <.001 59.87 <.001
Study 2a 60.3% 37.6% 75.8% 69.6% 27.90 <.001 23.11 <.001
Study 2b 52.5% 37.6% 77.8% 71.6% 15.16 <.001 45.24 <.001
Study 3a 48.4% 24.2% 79.0% 66.1% 41.03 <.001 63.16 <.001
Study 3b 59.3% 34.4% 76.7% 60.8% 42.85 <.001 21.11 <.001
Study 4a 64.1% 34.8% 68.5% 47.8% 59.28 <.001 2.78 .097
Study 4b 57.6% 31.8% 68.2% 50.5% 48.85 <.001 9.22 .003
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Table 3: Estimated parameter scores for sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general prefer-
ence for inaction versus action (I) as a function of gender (Studies 1a and 1b), cognitive load (Studies 2a and 2b), question
framing (Studies 3a and 3b), and psychopathy (Studies 4a and 4b). The table presents the original results reported by
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter (2017), and results with a reduced dilemma set that does not include
the abduction dilemma.
Full Dilemma Set
Study Score 95% CI Score 95% CI G2(1) p
1a men women difference
C .19 [.15, .23] .22 [.18, .26] 1.34 .247
N .15 [.10, .19] .33 [.28, .38] 26.00 <.001
I .48 [.45, .51] .56 [.52, .60] 12.34 <.001
1b men women difference
C .16 [.12, .20] .23 [.19, .27] 6.43 .011
N .26 [.21, .30] .40 [.35, .45] 18.95 <.001
I .46 [.42, .49] .53 [.49, .57] 9.12 .003
2a low load high load difference
C .21 [.17, .25] .18 [.14, .22] 1.35 .245
N .25 [.20, .30] .25 [.20, .30] 0.01 .927
I .47 [.44, .50] .52 [.49, .56] 5.19 .023
2b low load high load difference
C .21 [.17, .25] .17 [.13, .21] 2.08 .149
N .28 [.23, .32] .27 [.22, .32] 0.05 .826
I .46 [.43, .49] .55 [.51, .58] 13.77 <.001
3a moral judgment moral action difference
C .20 [.16, .24] .25 [.21, .28] 2.44 .118
N .39 [.34, .44] .33 [.28, .38] 3.14 .069
I .48 [.44, .52] .61 [.57, .65] 23.25 <.001
3b moral judgment moral action difference
C .23 [.19, .27] .22 [19, .26] 0.09 .767
N .32 [.26, .37] .23 [18., 28] 6.15 .013
I .44 [41, .48] .58 [.55, .61] 29.50 <.001
4a low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .25 [.21, .29] .20 [.16, .24] 2.77 .096
N .25 [.20, .30] .12 [.07, .17] 12.35 <.001
I .57 [.54, .61] .53 [.50, .56] 3.15 .076
4b low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .27 [.23, .30] .13 [.09, .17] 23.11 <.001
N .36 [.32, .41] .00 [-.05, .05] 111.80 <.001
I .59 [.56, .63] .53 [.50, .55] 8.90 .003
Without Abduction Dilemma
Study Score 95% CI Score 95% CI G2(1) p
1a men women difference
C .18 [.14, .22] .20 [.15, .24] 0.28 .595
N .23 [.18, .28] .37 [.32, .43] 13.63 <.001
I .48 [.45, .51] .57 [.53, .61] 11.47 <.001
1b men women difference
C .16 [.11, .20] .21 [.17, .25] 3.22 .073
N .32 [.27, .37] .45 [.39, .50] 15.91 .001
I .46 [.42, .50] .53 [.49, .48] 6.10 .013
2a low load high load difference
C .19 [.14, .23] .15 [.11, .20] 1.31 .253
N .32 [.27, .37] .31 [.26, .37] 0.03 .852
I .47 [.44, .51] .53 [.49, .56] 3.98 .046
2b low load high load difference
C .19 [.15, .23] .15 [.10, .19] 2.08 .149
N .35 [.30, .40] .33 [.27, .38] 0.41 .521
I .45 [.41, .49] .56 [.52, .59] 14.18 <.001
3a moral judgment moral action difference
C .17 [.16, .21] .22 [.18, .26] 3.37 .068
N .44 [.39, .49] .39 [.33, .44] 2.10 .147
I .49 [.48, .54] .62 [.58, .67] 17.45 <.001
3b moral judgment moral action difference
C .21 [.16, .25] .21 [.17, .25] <0.01 .970
N .37 [.31, .42] .28 [.22, .33] 5.32 .021
I .44 [.40, .48] .59 [.55, .63] 27.00 <.001
4a low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .23 [.19, .27] .18 [.13, .22] 2.71 .100
N .33 [.27, .38] .14 [.09, .19] 22.74 <.001
I .58 [.54, .63] .54 [.51, .57] 2.71 .100
4b low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .24 [.20, .28] .12 [.08, .17] 15.27 <.001
N .45 [.40, .50] .00 [-.05, .05] 148.20 <.001
I .62 [.57, .66] .52 [.49, .55] 13.60 <.001
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include the dilemmas of a newly created battery by Körner,
Deutsch and Gawronski (2020).3
6 “Perverse” Responses
In the preceding section, we responded to Baron and Good-
win’s (2020) concern that “perverse” responses on a subset
of CNI model dilemmas suggest problems with the valid-
ity of these dilemmas. As we explained, the validity of a
given dilemma for our modeling approach depends, not on
the presence versus absence of “perverse” responses, but on
the sensitivity of the four variants of a given dilemma in cap-
turing the manipulations of consequences and moral norms.
However, the mere occurrence of “perverse” responses led
Baron and Goodwin to raise an additional question: what
leads to “perverse” responses to our CNI model dilemmas?
In their critique, Baron and Goodwin suggested two poten-
tial answers: (1) participants disagree with our assumptions
underlying the manipulations of consequences and moral
norms and (2) participants pay insufficient attention.
We already responded to Baron and Goodwin’s (2020)
first answer in the section entitled “Moral Norms.” Regard-
ing their second answer, we would like to reiterate that the
mere occurrence of “perverse” responses is irrelevant for
our modeling approach. What is relevant instead is whether
responses differ as a function of our manipulations of conse-
quences and moral norms. From this perspective, Baron and
Goodwin’s question about the causes of “perverse” responses
must be rephrased as: what makes participants insensitive to
the manipulations of consequences and moral norms?
We fully agree that lack of attention can be an important
factor in this regard. After all, not reading the stimulus
materials will reduce effects of any experimental manipu-
lation that is embedded in the verbal materials participants
are asked to read, and this caveat applies to any study using
text-based manipulations regardless of whether they involve
the CNI model. For this reason, we generally include in-
structional attention checks to identify participants who may
not have read the dilemmas (see Oppenheimer, Meyvis &
Davidenko, 2009). Such attention checks are particularly
important for analyses regarding associations between re-
sponse times and dilemma judgments (such as the ones pre-
sented by Baron and Goodwin), because inattentiveness can
produce artifacts resulting from lower response times among
participants who do not carefully read the dilemmas. Indeed,
if inattentiveness can be ruled out via attention checks, asso-
ciations between response times and the CNI model param-
eters may indicate meaningful relations between cognitive
elaboration and moral judgments. However, without proper
attention checks, any such associations may be driven by lack
3A reanalysis of the data by Körner et al. (2020) revealed that every
item of their new dilemma battery meets the specified validity criteria for
capturing effects of consequences and moral norms.
of attention, as suggested by Baron and Goodwin (2020). We
generally agree with this concern.
Aside from inattentiveness, there are multiple other factors
that can reduce participants’ sensitivity to the manipulations
of consequences and moral norms. However, different from
Baron and Goodwin’s claim that any such effects demon-
strate problems with our modeling approach, we argue that
they reflect meaningful variations in moral judgments. For
example, as we noted above, the only case in which the N
parameter did not significantly differ from zero involved a
subsample of participants who were preselected based on
having psychopathy scores that placed them in the high-
est quartile of participants in a broader sample (Gawronski
et al., 2017, Study 4b). If one were to follow Baron and
Goodwin’s arguments, this result would be meaningless, be-
cause it suggests that these participants disagree with our
assumptions underlying the manipulation of moral norms.
However, based on the known characteristics of individu-
als high in psychopathy (Hare & Neumann, 2008), a more
plausible interpretation is that individuals high in psychopa-
thy are less sensitive to moral norms than individual low in
psychopathy. This conclusion is consistent with the differ-
ence between participants high versus low in psychopathy
obtained by Gawronski et al. (2017, Study 4b) and success-
ful replications of this effect in several follow-up studies
(Körner et al., 2020; Luke & Gawronski, in press). In our
view, these results do not call the validity of the CNI model
into question. Instead, they demonstrate the validity of the
model and its ability to provide more nuanced insights into
central questions at the intersection of moral and clinical
psychology. We will return to these findings in the section
entitled “Confounds in the Traditional Approach.”
Another argument put forward by Baron and Goodwin
is that the proportion of “perverse” responses is reduced if
participants’ own judgments are used to identify the relevant
moral norm in a given dilemma. As we explained above,
we deem this approach problematic, because it conflates two
distinct levels of analysis (see De Houwer, 2011; Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2015). In fact, classification of a behavioral
effect by means of underlying mental constructs would lead
to explanatory circularity, because the to-be-explained effect
becomes conceptually equivalent with the construct that is
supposed to explain the effect (see De Houwer, Gawronski &
Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015).
That is, if norm-congruent behavior would qualify as an ef-
fect of norms only if it is mediated by conscious thoughts
about norms, conscious thoughts about norms would not ex-
plain norm-congruent behavior, because the two would be
conceptually identical. It makes little sense to explain norm-
congruent behavior by conscious thoughts about norms if
norm-congruent behavior is defined by conscious thoughts
about norms. Such a conceptualization would also preclude
the possibility that norm-congruent behavior might be me-
diated by other mental processes that do not involve con-
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scious thoughts about norms, such as the affective mecha-
nisms proposed by Greene’s (2008) dual-process theory (see
also Haidt, 2001).
For these reasons, we reject Baron and Goodwin’s idea of
using participants’ self-classifications as a criterion for moral
norms. Instead, we would argue that the mechanisms under-
lying norm-congruent judgments is an empirical question.
It might be conscious thoughts about moral norms, affec-
tive responses to the idea of causing harm, or something
entirely different. In fact, it is possible that multiple distinct
processes can produce the same pattern of norm-congruent
judgments. Similar considerations apply to effects of conse-
quences, which may be driven by conscious reasoning about
consequences or an entirely different set of processes. In
hindsight, we acknowledge that the description of the N pa-
rameter as an indicator of sensitivity to moral norms is not
ideal, because it is ambiguous about the difference between
behavioral effects and underlying mental processes. A less
ambiguous description might refer to intrinsic aspects of the
focal action (e.g., actions causing harm vs. actions prevent-
ing harm; see Cushman, 2013) rather than the congruency of
these actions with proscriptive and prescriptive norms. Such
a description would also address the abovementioned con-
cern that congruence with moral norms is not a unique fea-
ture of the N parameter (see discussion under “Deontological
Responding”). Yet, regardless of the chosen label, the signif-
icance of the N parameter in understanding moral dilemma
judgments is supported by the finding that the N parame-
ter explains a considerable amount of variance in traditional
dilemma scores and accounts for a large number of exper-
imental effects and associations with individual-difference
variables. We will return to this issue in the section entitled
“Confounds in the Traditional Approach.”
7 Order Effects and Presumed Incon-
sistencies
Multinomial modeling is not just an alternative way of an-
alyzing data. Different from standard data analytical ap-
proaches (e.g., General Linear Model), multinomial mod-
eling integrates data analysis with theoretical assumptions
about observed response patterns (Hütter & Klauer, 2016).
In the CNI model, these assumptions are reflected in the
hierarchical relation of the three parameters in the process-
ing tree (see Figure 1), which can be criticized as arbitrary,
because they cannot be tested empirically. As we explained
in the original article presenting the CNI model (Gawronski
et al., 2017, Footnote 7), changes in the order of parameters
in the processing tree do not affect the fit of the model, in
that all six combinatorially possible models show the same
goodness-of-fit for a given data set. It is therefore not possi-
ble to empirically distinguish between these models, render-
ing assumptions about the hierarchical structure of the three
parameters arbitrary.
Baron and Goodwin express two concerns about this as-
pect of the CNI model. First, they claim that the order
of C and N in the processing tree conflicts with the cor-
rective dual-process theory (Greene, 2008), which suggests
that deontological judgments are the product of automatic
processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are the product of
controlled processes that correct the impact of automatically
generated deontological judgments. Second, they claim that
models with different orders of C and N in the processing
tree lead to inconsistent relations with external variables.
Both claims are incorrect.
Regarding the consistency of the parameter hierarchy with
the corrective dual-process theory (Greene, 2008), it is im-
portant to note that the hierarchical structure reflects condi-
tional relations of the parameters in determining behavioral
outcomes, not their temporal order in which their underlying
processes occur. In technical terms, the hierarchical structure
of parameters specifies conditional probabilities of input-
output relations, and time is not a meaningful variable in the
mathematics of conditional probabilities. In the CNI model,
we chose the current order of C and N to be consistent with
Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) earlier work using process
dissociation, and the order of the corresponding parameters
in their process dissociation model was chosen precisely be-
cause it is the one suggested by the corrective dual-process
theory. According to the theory, the processes underlying
deontological judgments influence outcomes only if they are
not overridden by the corrective processes underlying utili-
tarian judgments. In other words, the corrective processes
underlying utilitarian judgments will drive responses when-
ever these processes become active, and the processes un-
derlying deontological judgments will drive responses only
if the corrective processes underlying utilitarian judgments
fail to drive judgments. In Conway and Gawronski’s (2013)
process dissociation model, these assumptions are reflected
in the dominant status of the U parameter (claimed to reflect
utilitarian inclinations) compared to the subordinate status
of the D parameter (claimed to reflect deontological incli-
nations) in the hierarchy of parameters. Within the CNI
model, these assumptions are retained in the dominant sta-
tus of the C parameter compared to the subordinate status
of the N parameter. As we explained in the original article
presenting the CNI model (Gawronski et al., 2017, Footnote
7), the position of the I parameter was chosen to permit
an estimation of general action preferences along a bipo-
lar continuum of inaction versus action instead of a unipolar
dimensions reflecting relative differences in the general pref-
erence for inaction. This aspect requires that the I parameter
is included at the lowest location in the hierarchy instead of
being at one of the two superordinate locations.
Although the position of the I parameter can be justified on
methodological grounds, we agree with Baron and Goodwin
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(2020) that the relative position of C and N in the process-
ing tree remains arbitrary, raising the question of whether
reversing their positions qualifies any of the reported results.
Mathematically, reversing the positions of C and N changes
the model equations, in that the score estimated for N is
conditional upon 1 − C in the original model, whereas the
score estimated for C is conditional upon 1 − N in the re-
versed model (see Appendix B). Although these changes do
not affect the goodness-of-fit of the model (see above), they
can influence relations with external variables. Thus, it is
perfectly justified to ask the question of whether the findings
obtained with the CNI model depend on the chosen position
of C and N in the processing tree.
Baron and Goodwin (2020) claim that reordering C and
N in the processing tree leads to inconsistent results, with
some external variables (e.g., gender) showing relations to
the parameters of the reversed model that are opposite to
the ones obtained for the original model. However, a closer
inspection of the results indicates that this claim is incorrect.
Table 4 provides a summary of the results obtained with the
original model (C-N-I order), along with a summary of the
results obtained with a model in which the positions of C
and N are reversed (N-C-I order). For 21 of the 24 compar-
isons, the two models produce the same outcomes in terms of
whether the comparison reached statistical significance with
an alpha criterion of p < .05. In two cases, a marginal dif-
ference obtained with the original model reaches statistical
significance with the reversed model. These cases involve
the effect of question framing on the N parameter in Study
3a and the association of psychopathy with the C parame-
ter in Study 4a. In one case, a non-significant difference in
the original model is statistically significant in the reversed
model. This case involves the association between gender
and the C parameter in Study 1a. Counter to Baron and
Goodwin’s (2020) claim, all of the obtained relations be-
tween the three model parameters and external variables are
directionally consistent across the two model variants.4
How is it possible that Baron and Goodwin (2020) reached
an entirely different conclusion in their own reanalysis of our
data? The simple reason is that they did not use the CNI
model in their reanalysis. Instead, they used two versions of
Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) process dissociation model,
one in which U dominates over D (as in Conway and Gawron-
ski’ model) and one in which D dominates over U (opposite
to the order in Conway and Gawronski’s model). Baron and
4To further investigate the robustness of our original findings, we have
also used the reversed model to reanalyze Gawronski et al.’s (2017) data
without the Abduction Dilemma. The analyses yielded similar results, in
that the two models produced the same outcomes for 22 of the 24 com-
parisons. In the two deviating cases, a marginal difference obtained with
the original model reaches statistical significance with the reversed model.
These cases involve the effect of question framing on the N parameter in
Study 3a and the association between psychopathy and the C parameter in
Study 4a. The results of this reanalysis are summarized in Appendix C. The
analysis files for the reported reanalyses are available at https://osf.io/u59zs/.
Goodwin then used the two versions to separately analyze
responses to dilemmas with either proscriptive or prescrip-
tive norms. Using this approach to reanalyze the data from
Studies 1a and 1b of Gawronski et al. (2017), Baron and
Goodwin identified inconsistencies in the relation between
gender and the U parameter across the four cases, with one
case showing gender effects that are directionally opposite
to the ones in the other three cases.
We deem these findings uninformative for the validity of
the CNI model, because (1) the analyses did not use the CNI
model and (2) a proper analysis with the CNI model yields
consistent results across model specifications (see Table 4).
Indeed, there is a simple technical explanation why Baron
and Goodwin’s (2020) reanalysis using the PD model to com-
pare results across dilemmas with proscriptive and prescrip-
tive norms yields inconsistent results. In the PD model, gen-
eral preference for inaction versus action is confounded with
the two constructs of interest (see Gawronski et al., 2016;
Hütter & Klauer, 2016), and these confounds are direction-
ally opposite in cases involving proscriptive and prescriptive
norms. For dilemmas involving proscriptive norms, a gen-
eral preference for inaction versus action increases scores on
the D parameter and decreases scores on the U parameter.
For dilemmas involving prescriptive norms, a general pref-
erence for inaction versus action decreases scores on the D
parameter and increases scores on the U parameter. Because
the relative impact of these confounds varies as a function
of the hierarchy of the two parameters in the processing tree,
they can lead to inconsistent results as a function of model
specifications (i.e., U-D order vs. D-U order) and type of
norm (proscriptive vs. prescriptive) if a given variable (e.g.,
gender) is associated with general preference for inaction
versus action. By controlling for general action preferences
in the I parameter, the CNI model not only resolves these
problems; it also leads to consistent results irrespective of
the position of C and the N in the processing tree (see Ta-
ble 4). Thus, although the results of Baron and Goodwin’s
(2020) reanalysis echo our own concerns about conceptual
problems of Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) PD model (see
Gawronski et al., 2016; Hütter & Klauer, 2016), they have
no implications for the validity of the CNI model.
8 Confounds in the Traditional Ap-
proach
Baron and Goodwin (2020) conclude their critique stating
that the “CNI model requires use of congruent items that
must yield enough ‘perverse’ responses (those that both vi-
olate norms and produce worse consequences) so that the
model provides results that differ from standard analysis”
(p. 434). As we explained above, their focus on ‘perverse’
responses reflects a misunderstanding of the model’s under-
lying idea. Whereas the C parameter quantifies the extent to
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Table 4: Estimated parameter scores for sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general prefer-
ence for inaction versus action (I) as a function of gender (Studies 1a and 1b), cognitive load (Studies 2a and 2b), question
framing (Studies 3a and 3b), and psychopathy (Studies 4a and 4b). The table presents the results of Gawronski, Armstrong,
Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter’s (2017) studies using the original CNI model (C-N-I order) and a modified version in which the
order of N and C are reversed in the hierarchical structure of the model (N-C-I order).
C-N-I Order
Study Score 95% CI Score 95% CI G2(1) p
1a men women difference
C .19 [.15, .23] .22 [.18, .26] 1.34 .247
N .15 [.10, .19] .33 [.28, .38] 26.00 <.001
I .48 [.45, .51] .56 [.52, .60] 12.34 <.001
1b men women difference
C .16 [.12, .20] .23 [.19, .27] 6.43 .011
N .26 [.21, .30] .40 [.35, .45] 18.95 <.001
I .46 [.42, .49] .53 [.49, .57] 9.12 .003
2a low load high load difference
C .21 [.17, .25] .18 [.14, .22] 1.35 .245
N .25 [.20, .30] .25 [.20, .30] 0.01 .927
I .47 [.44, .50] .52 [.49, .56] 5.19 .023
2b low load high load difference
C .21 [.17, .25] .17 [.13, .21] 2.08 .149
N .28 [.23, .32] .27 [.22, .32] 0.05 .826
I .46 [.43, .49] .55 [.51, .58] 13.77 <.001
3a moral judgment moral action difference
C .20 [.16, .24] .25 [.21, .28] 2.44 .118
N .39 [.34, .44] .33 [.28, .38] 3.14 .069
I .48 [.44, .52] .61 [.57, .65] 23.25 <.001
3b moral judgment moral action difference
C .23 [.19, .27] .22 [19, .26] 0.09 .767
N .32 [.26, .37] .23 [18., 28] 6.15 .013
I .44 [41, .48] .58 [.55, .61] 29.50 <.001
4a low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .25 [.21, .29] .20 [.16, .24] 2.77 .096
N .25 [.20, .30] .12 [.07, .17] 12.35 <.001
I .57 [.54, .61] .53 [.50, .56] 3.15 .076
4b low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .27 [.23, .30] .13 [.09, .17] 23.11 <.001
N .36 [.32, .41] .00 [-.05, .05] 111.80 <.001
I .59 [.56, .63] .53 [.50, .55] 8.90 .003
N-C-I Order
Study Score 95% CI Score 95% CI G2(1) p
1a men women difference
C .21 [.17, .27] .29 [.24, .35] 5.51 .019
N .12 [.08, .16] .25 [.22, .29] 23.74 <.001
I .48 [.45, .51] .56 [.52, .60] 12.34 <.001
1b men women difference
C .21 [.16, .26] .33 [.28, 39] 11.77 <.001
N .22 [.18, .26] .31 [.27, .35] 11.61 <.001
I .46 [.42, .49] .53 [.49, .57] 9.12 .003
2a low load high load difference
C .26 [.21, .31] .22 [.17, .27] 1.12 .289
N .20 [.16, .24] .21 [.17, .25] 0.15 .700
I .47 [.44, .50] .52 [.49, .56] 5.19 .023
2b low load high load difference
C .27 [.22, .32] .22 [.16, .27] 1.93 .164
N .22 [.18, .26] .22 [.18, .26] 0.03 .864
I .46 [.43, .49] .55 [.51, 58] 13.77 <.001
3a moral judgment moral action difference
C .30 [.24, .35] .33 [.28, .38] 0.66 .418
N .31 [.27, .35] .25 [.21, .28] 5.78 .016
I .48 [.44, .52] .61 [.57, .65] 23.25 <.001
3b moral judgment moral action difference
C .31 [.25, .36] .27 [.22, .32] 0.96 .326
N .24 [.20, .28] .18 [.14, .21] 5.85 .016
I .44 [.41, .48] .58 [.55, .61] 29.50 <.001
4a low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .30 [.26, .35] .22 [.17, .27] 6.08 .013
N .19 [.15, .23] .10 [.06, .14] 10.35 .001
I .57 [.54, .61] .53 [.50, .56] 3.15 .076
4b low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .36 [.31, .41] .13 [.09, .17] 49.43 <.001
N .27 [.23, 30] .00 [-.04, .04] 95.34 <.001
I .59 [.56, .63] .53 [.50, .55] 8.90 .003
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which responses are influenced by consequences and the N
parameter quantifies the extent to which responses are influ-
enced by moral norms, the I parameter quantifies the extent
to which responses reflect a general preference for inaction
versus action. In technical terms, the C and the N parameter
quantify the impact of two experimental manipulations; the I
parameter is conceptually similar to an intercept in a General
Linear Model, in that it captures general response tendencies
independent of the two experimental manipulations. Thus,
what matters within the CNI model are differences (or the
lack of differences) in responses across dilemmas involving
different consequences and moral norms, not absolute re-
sponses to a particular kind of dilemma. In fact, counter
Baron and Goodwin’s claim that the CNI model requires
“perverse” responses, substantial proportions of “perverse”
responses would be detrimental to the model, because they
would lead to (1) poor model fit in the description of data due
to violations of model assumptions and (2) estimates for the
C and the N parameters close to zero due to reduced effects
of their corresponding manipulations.
Counter to Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) preference for the
traditional approach of pitting moral norms against conse-
quences for the greater good, we argue that the three factors
captured by the CNI model are confounded in the traditional
approach. These confounds render any finding with the tra-
ditional approach ambiguous, in that differences in the pref-
erence for “utilitarian” over “deontological” judgments may
be driven by differences in the sensitivity to consequences,
differences in the sensitivity to moral norms, or differences
in the general preference for inaction versus action (or any
combination of the three).
The conflation of the three factors in the traditional ap-
proach can be illustrated by means of multiple regression
analyses, in which preference for “utilitarian” over “deon-
tological” judgments on traditional dilemmas pitting a pro-
scriptive norm against consequences for the greater good is
predicted by the three CNI parameters. Table 5 presents the
results of such multiple regression analyses for a series of
four studies by Körner et al. (2020).5 Because responses
on traditional dilemmas are used in the CNI model equa-
tions to estimate numerical values for the three parameters
(see Appendix A), we ensured mathematical independence
of predictors and outcomes by using CNI model parameters
for dilemmas with odd item numbers to predict traditional
dilemma scores for dilemmas with even item numbers. Con-
versely, we used CNI model parameters for dilemmas with
even item numbers to predict traditional dilemma scores for
5Because multinomial modeling requires a sufficient number of obser-
vations from each participant to provide reliable parameter estimates at the
individual level, such regression analyses were not feasible with the origi-
nal set of 24 dilemmas for research using the CNI model (Gawronski et al.,
2017). However, estimation of parameters at the individual level is possible
with an extended set of 48 dilemmas presented by Körner et al. (2020),
which was used for the analyses reported in Table 5. The analysis files for
the reported reanalyses are available at https://osf.io/u59zs/.
dilemmas with odd item numbers. For the four studies re-
ported by Körner et al. (2020), this approach led a total of
eight multiple regressions. In Studies 1a and 1b, participants
were asked to judge whether the described action is accept-
able. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants were asked whether
they would perform the described action.6
Table 5 shows the results of the multiple regression analy-
ses. For the N parameter, greater sensitivity to moral norms
showed a significant negative association with preference
for “utilitarian” over “deontological” judgments in all eight
cases. For the C parameter, greater sensitivity to conse-
quences showed a significant positive association with pref-
erence for “utilitarian” over “deontological” judgments in
seven of the eight regressions. For the I parameter, the re-
sults were somewhat less reliable, in that general preference
for inaction versus action showed a significant negative asso-
ciation with preference for “utilitarian” over “deontological”
judgments in four of the eight regressions. A potential reason
for the mixed results for the I parameter is that estimates for
parameters with a lower position in the hierarchy of multi-
nomial processing trees tend to be less reliable compared to
estimates for parameters with a higher position in the hier-
archy.7 Nevertheless, the regression results indicate that the
three CNI parameters capture unique variance in traditional
dilemmas scores and the direction of their associations is
consistent with the proposed confounds.
By disentangling the three determinants of moral dilemma
judgments, the CNI model provides much more nuanced in-
sights that cannot be gained with the traditional approach.
For example, although reduced preference for “utilitar-
ian” over “deontological” judgments under cognitive load
has been interpreted as reflecting the resource-dependence
of utilitarian reasoning about costs and benefits (Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008), results ob-
tained with the CNI model suggest that cognitive load influ-
ences moral dilemma judgments by increasing general pref-
erence for inaction versus action (Gawronski et al., 2017,
Studies 2a and 2b). Moreover, Gawronski and Brannon
(2020) found that greater preference for “utilitarian” over
“deontological” judgments resulting from recalling personal
memories of high (vs. low) power is driven by a reduced
6In Footnote 9 of their critique, Baron and Goodwin (2020) express con-
cerns that asking participants about the acceptability of the described action
may induce a bias against utilitarian responding. In response to this con-
cern, it is worth noting that asking participants whether they would perform
the described action leads to higher mean-level scores on the I parameter
and lower mean-level scores on the N parameter, with scores on the C pa-
rameter being unaffected by the type of question framing (see Gawronski
et al., 2017; Körner et al., 2020). Nevertheless, relations to external vari-
ables have been found to be invariant for the two kinds of question framings
(Körner et al., 2020), rendering the obtained mean-level differences incon-
sequential for research investigating effects of experimental manipulations
and associations with individual-difference variables.
7Consistent with this interpretation, Spearman-Brown coefficients based
on test halves with odd and even trials were .65 for the C parameter, .67 for
the N parameter, and .35 for the I parameter in the combined data of the
four studies.
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Table 5: Results of multiple regression analyses predicting traditional dilemma scores (i.e., preference for “utilitarian” over
“deontological” judgments on dilemmas that pit a proscriptive norm against consequences for the greater good) by sensitivity
to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I). For CNI parameters
marked odd, the CNI parameters were calculated based on dilemmas with odd trial numbers and traditional dilemma scores
were calculated based on dilemmas with even trial numbers. For CNI parameters marked even, the CNI parameters were
calculated based on dilemmas with even trial numbers and traditional dilemma scores were calculated based on dilemmas
with odd trial numbers. Reanalysis of data by Körner, Deutsch, and Gawronski (2020).
Study 1a N = 161 Study 1b N = 177 Study 2a N = 196 Study 2b N = 189
V t p V t p V t p V t p
Codd .192 2.53 .012 .137 2.03 .044 .090 1.32 .187 .177 2.53 .012
Nodd -.342 -4.68 <.001 -.442 -6.68 <.001 -.387 -5.79 <.001 -.340 -5.13 <.001
Iodd -.274 -3.63 <.001 -.268 -4.03 <.001 -.098 -1.42 .158 -.291 -4.16 <.001
Adj. R2 .181 .254 .160 .179
Ceven .320 4.46 <.001 .287 4.35 <.001 .393 6.12 <.001 .309 4.67 <.001
Neven -.383 -5.30 <.001 -.356 -5.36 <.001 -.386 -5.97 <.001 -.318 -4.70 <.001
Ieven -.102 -1.44 .151 -.302 -4.62 <.001 .043 0.68 .499 -.096 -1.42 .158
Adj. R2 .208 .266 .231 .186
sensitivity to moral norms rather than increased sensitivity
to consequences or reduced action aversion. Findings by
Gawronski et al. (2018) further indicate that happiness in-
creases the preference for “utilitarian” over “deontological”
judgments (see Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) by reducing
sensitivity to moral norms, suggesting that happiness influ-
ences moral judgments by damping negative affective re-
sponses to the idea of violating moral norms (see Nichols
& Mallon, 2006) rather than negative affective responses
to the idea of causing harm (see Greene, 2008). Finally,
Gawronski et al. (2017, Studies 3a and 3b) found that per-
sonal involvement decreased sensitivity to moral norms and
increased general preference for inaction versus action (see
also Körner et al., 2020), indicating that the same factor can
have opposite effects on the two patterns of deontological
responding.
In our view, the most interesting insights are provided by
studies that have used the CNI model to investigate associ-
ations between psychopathy and moral dilemma judgments
(e.g., Gawronski et al., 2017, Studies 4a and 4b; Körner et
al., 2020; Luke & Gawronski, in press). Numerous previous
studies using the traditional dilemma approach have found
a positive association between psychopathy and preference
for “utilitarian” over “deontological” judgments (for a meta-
analysis, see Marshall, Watts & Lilienfeld, 2018). Some
researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence for a
major flaw of moral dilemma research, because it is obvious
that individuals high in psychopathy do not care about the
greater good in a utilitarian sense (e.g., Bartels & Pizarro,
2011; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, Savulescu, 2015). Re-
search using the CNI model resolves this paradox, showing
that individuals high in psychopathy differ from those low
in psychopathy by showing (1) a weaker sensitivity to con-
sequences on the C parameter, (2) a weaker sensitivity to
moral norms on the N parameter, and (3) a weaker general
preference for inaction versus action on the I parameter. The
most interesting aspect of these findings is that individuals
high in psychopathy showed a weaker sensitivity to con-
sequences in a utilitarian sense, which stands in contrast to
the positive association between psychopathy and preference
for “utilitarian” over “deontological” judgments in the tradi-
tional approach. This discrepancy can be explained by the
finding that psychopathy shows a large negative association
with sensitivity moral norms and a moderate negative as-
sociation with general preference for inaction versus action,
which conceal a moderate negative association with sensitiv-
ity to consequences when the three factors are confounded
in the traditional dilemma approach. Further research by
Luke and Gawronski (in press) suggests that some of these
associations are driven by a poor understanding of societal
standards about right and wrong among individuals high in
psychopathy. For other associations, the results suggest that
psychopaths are aware of societal standards about right and
wrong, but do not care about using these standards in their
personal judgments. These complex findings speak against
the possibility that associations between psychopathy and
the three CNI model parameters merely reflect inattentive-
ness among individuals high in psychopathy, as Baron and
Goodwin (2020) might argue based on their critique.
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9 Conclusion
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to correct potential
misconceptions about the CNI model, like the ones reflected
in Baron and Goodwin’s (2020) critique. Although their cri-
tique reveals a need for greater precision in the description of
the three model parameters and for greater attention to prop-
erties of individual dilemmas, we deem their dismissal of the
CNI model as misguided, because it is based on: (1) misun-
derstandings of key aspects of the model; (2) a conceptually
problematic conflation of behavioral effects and explanatory
mental constructs; (3) arguments that are inconsistent with
empirical evidence; and (4) reanalyses that supposedly show
inconsistent findings resulting from changes in model spec-
ifications, although the reported reanalyes did not actually
use the CNI model and proper analyses with the CNI model
yield consistent findings across model specifications. Based
on the available evidence, we conclude that the CNI model
is a valid, robust, and empirically sound approach to gain-
ing deeper insights into the determinants of moral dilemma
judgments, overcoming major limitations of the traditional
approach.
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11 Appendix A
CNI model equations for the estimation of sensitivity to
consequences (), sensitivity to moral norms (#), and gen-
eral preference for inaction versus action () in responses to
moral dilemmas with proscriptive versus prescriptive norms
and benefits of action for overall well-being that are either
greater or smaller than the costs of action for well-being.
Equations adapted from Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway,
Friesdorf, and Hütter (2017). Reprinted with permission
from the American Psychological Association.
?(inaction|proscriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
[(1 − ) × #] + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × ]
?(inaction|proscriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
 + [(1 − ) × #] + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × ]
?(inaction|prescriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
(1 − ) × (1 − #) × 
?(inaction|prescriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
 + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × ]
?(action|proscriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
 + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × (1 − )]
?(action|proscriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
(1 − ) × (1 − #) × (1 − )
?(action|prescriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
 + [(1 − ) × #] + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × (1 − )]
?(action|prescriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
[(1 − ) × #] + [(1 − ) × (1 − #) × (1 − )]
12 Appendix B
Model equations for the estimation of sensitivity to moral
norms (#), sensitivity to consequences (), and general pref-
erence for inaction versus action () in responses to moral
dilemmas with proscriptive versus prescriptive norms and
benefits of action for overall well-being that are either greater
or smaller than the costs of action for well-being. The equa-
tions characterize a model that is conceptually similar to the
CNI model, the only difference being that the hierarchical
positions of  and # are reversed in the processing tree (i.e.,
N-C-I instead of C-N-I).
?(inaction|proscriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
# + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × ]
?(inaction|proscriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
# + [(1 − #) × ] + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × ]
?(inaction|prescriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
(1 − #) × (1 − ) × 
?(inaction|prescriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
[(1 − #) × ] + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × ]
?(action|proscriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
[(1 − #) × ] + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × (1 − )]
?(action|proscriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
(1 − #) × (1 − ) × (1 − )
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?(action|prescriptive norm, benefits > costs) =
# + [(1 − #) × ] + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × (1 − )]
?(action|prescriptive norm, benefits < costs) =
# + [(1 − #) × (1 − ) × (1 − )]
13 Appendix C
Estimated parameter scores for sensitivity to consequences
(), sensitivity to moral norms (#), and general preference
for inaction versus action () as a function of gender (Stud-
ies 1a and 1b), cognitive load (Studies 2a and 2b), question
framing (Studies 3a and 3b), and psychopathy (Studies 4a and
4b). The table presents the results of a reanalysis of Gawron-
ski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, and Hütter’s (2017) data
with a modified version of the CNI model in which the po-
sitions of  and # are reversed in the processing tree (i.e.,
N-C-I instead of C-N-I) and responses to the four variants of
the Abduction Dilemma are excluded.
Study Score 95% CI Score 95% CI G2(1) p
1a men women difference
C .22 [.17, .27] .28 [.22, .34] 2.01 .156
N .19 [.15, .23] .30 [.26, .34] 12.85 <.001
I .48 [.45, .51] .57 [.53, .61] 11.47 <.001
1b men women difference
C .21 [.16, .27] .32 [.26, .39] 6.53 .011
N .27 [.22, .31] .35 [.31, .39] 8.09 .004
I .46 [.42, .50] .53 [.49, .58] 6.10 .013
2a low load high load difference
C .25 [.20, .31] .21 [.15, .27] 1.21 .272
N .26 [.22, .30] .27 [.22, .31] 0.03 .862
I .47 [.44, .51] .53 [.49, .56] 3.98 .046
2b low load high load difference
C .26 [.21, .32] .20 [.14, .26] 2.18 .140
N .28 [.24, .32] .28 [.23, .32] 0.03 .868
I .45 [.41, .49] .56 [.52, .59] 14.18 <.001
3a moral judgment moral action difference
C .27 [.20, .33] .32 [.26, .38] 1.38 .240
N .37 [.33, .41] .30 [.26, .34] 5.00 .025
I .49 [.45, .54] .62 [.58, .67] 17.45 <.001
3b moral judgment moral action difference
C .29 [.23, .35] .26 [.21, .32] 0.37 .543
N .29 [.25, .33] .22 [.18, .26] 5.51 .019
I .44 [.40, .48] .59 [.55, .63] 27.01 <.001
4a low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .31 [.25, .36] .20 [.15, .25] 7.41 .006
N .25 [.21, .30] .11 [.07, .16] 19.59 <.001
I .58 [.54, .63] .54 [.51, .57] .271 .100
4b low psychopathy high psychopathy difference
C .37 [.31, .42] .12 [.08, .17] 41.48 <.001
N .34 [.31, .38] .00 [-.05, .05] 131.99 <.001
I .62 [.57, .66] .52 [.49, .55] 13.60 <.001
